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1. How Does a Philosopher Get to Be Great?
This is not the first time I have had occasion to reflect on the question of what 
makes a philosopher great. I was once asked, in the course of a job interview 
in a philosophy department, if I really believed that there were philosophers in 
the Indian tradition as great as Plato or Kant. Being young and naïve, I set about 
answering by providing a description of the philosophical accomplishments of 
one or two cases. That was, of course, a very ineffective way to handle the 
question, because what the question really asked was, ‘Were there any Indian 
philosophers who could be counted as great according to standards of greatness 
defined for and within the European philosophical tradition?’ It was like being 
asked whether India had great composers, the presupposition being that to be a 
great composer one has to compose symphonies. Evidently, the quest for a clas-
sical Indian musician who happened to spring on the world a great symphony 
is likely to be forlorn, and the comparable quest in the realm of philosophy is 
no less quixotic. The question, moreover, sought to ensnare me in a trap, one 
that consists in the following vicious dilemma: either Indian philosophers are 
making comparable philosophical discoveries to Western philosophers, with 
comparable philosophical tools and techniques, or else they are not. If the first, 
then there is no need to study them, since the tools and discoveries are already 
to hand; if the second, there is no point in studying them, since what they are 
doing is not philosophy as ‘we’ understand it. In responding as I did, I merely 
impaled myself on the first horn of this dilemma.
A greater degree of sensitivity to the issues than I encountered among my 
erstwhile colleagues in philosophy was manifest in a recent symposium in Berlin 
entitled ‘Globalizing the Classics’. In Oxford, the Classics are known as ‘Greats’, 
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and the question ‘What makes a philosopher great?’ mutates into the question, 
‘What makes something a classic?’ The Oxford classicist Edith Hall has offered 
an answer, speaking about this very topic in her Gaisford Lecture at the University 
of Oxford on June 4, 2015 (Hall 2015). Hall laments the fact that the provision 
of education in the classics in Britain is now highly polarized, with the classics 
(she means, of course, the Greek classics) exalted in private schools and elite 
colleges but utterly ignored in the state system and in the majority of universities 
outside Oxbridge. Hall argues that the classics are too special to be ghettoized, 
but she is more than conscious that the topic of the exceptionalism of Greek 
classicism is deeply tendentious. She says this (2015):
The question has become painfully politicised. Critics of colonialism and 
racism tend to play down the specialness of the ancient Greeks. Those 
who maintain that there was something identifiably different and even 
superior about the Greeks, on the other hand, are often die-hard conserva-
tives who have a vested interest in proving the superiority of ‘Western’ 
ideals and in making evaluative judgements of culture. My problem is that 
I fit into neither camp. I am certainly opposed to colonialism and racism, 
and have investigated reactionary abuses of the classical tradition in colonial 
India and by apologists of slavery all the way through to the American 
Civil War. But my constant engagement with the ancient Greeks and their 
culture has made me more, rather than less, convinced that they asked a 
series of questions which are difficult to identify in combination amongst 
any of the other cultures of the ancient Mediterranean or North Eastern 
antiquity.
One might think that, in order to reach the conviction that the Greeks are 
this special, Hall would have had to spend time engaging with the non-Greek 
classical civilizations of India and China, about which there is not a single 
word in her entire lecture, although she feels confident enough to venture 
that ‘none of these peoples produced anything quite equivalent to Athenian 
democracy, comic theatre, philosophical logic, or Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.’ 
Let me let that pass, though, because what she does say is more interesting. 
Hall acknowledges that many recent advances in scholarship about the cultures 
of the Ancient Near East have called into question the idea that the ancient 
Greeks were special. These advances ‘have revealed how much the Greeks 
shared with and absorbed from their predecessors and neighbours . . . they 
reveal the Greek “miracle” to have been one constituent in a continuous 
process of intercultural exchange’. She accepts that ‘taken singly, most Greek 
achievements can be paralleled in the culture of at least one of their neigh-
bours’: the Babylonians knew Pythagoras’s theorem; the Phoenicians created 
the phonetic alphabet; the Hittites, also highly literate, developed chariot 
technology; the Egyptians, medicina, based on empirical experience; and so on 
15031-1250-FullBook.indd   68 8/25/2017   10:38:11 AM
Attention to Greatness: Buddhaghosa 69
for Mesopotamia, the Levant, Persia, and Asia Minor. Summing up the situ-
ation, she says this:
Some scholars have gone so far as to ask whether the Greeks came up 
with anything new at all, or whether they merely acted as a conduit 
through which the combined wisdom of all the civilisations of the eastern 
Mediterranean was disseminated across the territories conquered by Alex-
ander the Great, before arriving at Rome and posterity. Others have seen 
sinister racist motives at work [and have] claimed, with some justification, 
that northern Europeans have systematically distorted and concealed the 
evidence showing how much the ancient Greeks owed to Semitic and 
African peoples rather than to Indo-European ‘Aryan’ traditions.
Then in what does the special greatness of the Greeks consist? Hall’s answer is 
as follows:
I do not deny that the Greeks acted as a conduit for other ancient peoples’ 
achievements. But to function successfully as a conduit, channel, or inter-
mediary is in itself to perform an exceptional role . . . Taking over someone 
else’s technical knowledge requires an opportunistic ability to identify a 
serendipitous find or encounter, excellent communicative skills, and the 
imagination to seek how a technique, story or object could be adapted to 
a different linguistic and cultural milieu . . . Of course the Greeks were 
not by nature or in potential superior to any other human beings, either 
physically or intellectually . . . But that does not mean they were not the 
right people, in the right place, at the right time, to take up the human 
baton of intellectual progress for several hundred years.
There is, again in this comment, a certain blindness to the relay races already 
being run in China and India. But what I find fascinating is that the best efforts 
of contemporary classical scholarship to unearth that unique feature that made 
Greek civilization great has ended up concluding that their exceptionalism was 
in how well they made use of the ideas and innovations of others. Hardly 
exceptional enough, one would have thought, to justify Macaulay declaring that 
one shelf of Greek classics was of greater value to humanity than the entirety 
of Sanskrit literature combined.
There is an entirely comparable discussion to be had about the concept of a 
philosophical great. One does not need to look very far for philosophers who 
are willing to endorse a version of the exceptionalist position—indeed, that was 
the presupposition behind the question I was asked in my interview, a presup-
position I was too young and naïve to challenge directly. The more sincere, 
among the philosophers, will perhaps be willing to concede, as Hall does, that 
much of what makes European philosophy exceptional consists in its borrowings 
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and reworkings of borrowed ideas. If that was true in the ancient world, how 
much more so in the early modern, when, thanks to colonialism, Europeans 
were certainly ‘in the right place, at the right time’ to make wholesale appropria-
tions of the intellectual innovations of others. During the period of the British 
colonial occupation of India, the dominant impression that the British left in 
the minds of Indian intellectuals was of the British as being a profoundly unphi-
losophical people. The Benares-based scholar James R. Ballantyne spoke of ‘the 
impression, here yet too prevalent, that the Europeans, though capital workers 
in brass and iron, had better leave the discussion of things intellectual to those 
whose land was the birth-place of philosophy’ (1859: 150). Wholesale looting 
of Indian ideas, without due citation, was the norm. Let me give one example. 
It is difficult to establish the exact influence that Indian ideas about logic may 
have had on the British logicians George Boole and Augustus De Morgan, 
although there is evidence of a line of transmission through a fellow member 
of the Royal Society, the brilliant Indologist and translator of Indian philosophical 
and mathematical texts, Henry T. Colebrooke. The absence of any mention of 
Indian philosophy in the philosophical work of John Stuart Mill, son of the 
author of the colonial manifesto A History of British India, James Mill, and himself 
an administrator in the East India Company, is quite striking; for he was in 
correspondence with Ballantyne, who had by then translated works in Indian 
logic, several of which contain accounts of a method of agreement and differ-
ence strikingly similar to Mill’s own. It is more or less certain, too, that Mill 
read or even attended Colebrooke’s famous lecture of 1827 (Colebrooke 1837), 
in which he described the emergentist philosophy of mind of the Indian mate-
rialist school of the Cārvāka thinker Bṛhaspati, a great philosophy that modern 
historians now trace back to Mill. Colebrooke’s work enjoyed in general an 
extremely wide circulation—even Hegel had some of his writings, and his trans-
lations of Sanskrit texts about mathematics were, as I have mentioned, well-known 
to De Morgan and Boole. It is striking now how many of the ideas that were 
to find a place in British Emergentism are already available in that text—Mill, 
for example, using the example of chemical change to illustrate his idea of a 
‘heteropathic law’ in A System of Logic (1843). It seems likely that Mill, a person 
whose duties as a senior official of the East India Company included correspon-
dence with Colebrooke, and who belonged with him to a circle of London 
literati based around the Royal Society, had heard Colebrooke’s lecture, or read 
it when it was published in 1837, the very time when he was working on A 
System of Logic. I cannot help but wonder whether the Indian materialist Bṛhaspati 
did not, after all, have a role in the emergence of British emergentism.
I say all of this only to prepare the ground for a definition of greatness in 
philosophy that does not rest on false presuppositions about European excep-
tionalism and universalism. If one asks, of a philosopher from India or China, 
Africa, or Mesoamerica, what makes them great, one had better not simply try 
to situate their philosophical accomplishments on a scale from Plato to Parfit. 
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One more reason why this would be a quixotic enterprise: thinkers like Plato 
and Kant have been the subject of a vast philosophical industry of interpretation, 
especially perhaps in the last hundred years. What we think of when we think 
of Kant is thus the output of a great collaboration by many of the best resourced 
academics of the last century. No Indian or Chinese or African thinker has 
benefited correspondingly from well-funded study on an industrial scale. So, if 
we compare what is associated with the name tags ‘Plato’ and ‘Gaṅgeśa’, we are 
comparing the output of a great intellectual apparatus with the humble offerings 
of a few scholars—hardly a good way to answer the question ‘Which one is 
great?’
I propose, then, to speak to the question by inquiring, instead, into the extent 
to which a thinker—whatever the source of their ideas—transforms the philo-
sophical landscape in which they work. To count as a great, a philosopher must 
draw on a past intellectual history, rethink it, modify and adapt it in such a way 
that the landscape is irrevocably altered; indeed, in such a way that any later 
thinker cannot help but look back on the past as it was before that thinker as, 
if not antiquated, then at least as meaningful only in terms of the rearticulation 
that has now been provided. In the European tradition, Kant is a standout 
example of a philosopher who is great according to my definition; indeed, he 
more or less explicitly describes himself as great in such terms with his distinc-
tion between pre-critical and critical philosophy. In Sanskritic India, a list of 
standout examples would include such radical reinterpreters of the Buddha as 
Nāgārjuna and Dignāga, game-changers in the logic of inquiry like Jayanta and 
Gaṅgeśa, freelance philosophers such as Jayarāśi and Śrīharṣa, not to mention 
‘great souls’ (mahātma) like M. K. Gandhi and K. C. Bhattacharyya (see Ganeri 
forthcoming). I will, however, turn my attention to a philosopher who was 
trained in the Sanskrit tradition but who chose to write outside it: his name is 
Buddhaghosa.
2. Buddhaghosa
The fifth-century philosopher Buddhaghosa has been described as possessing 
‘one of the greatest minds in the history of Buddhism’ (Heim 2014: 4). A cos-
mopolitan intellectual, Buddhaghosa moved between India and Sri Lanka, between 
Sanskrit and Pāli, between Hinduism and Buddhism, in search of a fundamental 
theory of mind. Buddhaghosa’s ideas would influence conceptions of the human 
throughout South and Southeast Asia for a millennium and a half, and they 
continue to do so today. Their philosophical significance, moreover, is global in 
reach. As with every intellectual genius, Buddhaghosa stood on the shoulders of 
giants. As with every Indian intellectual genius, he prefers to say that he is merely 
hitching a ride. The truth is somewhere in the middle—a man of great bril-
liance, he owed the opportunity to be brilliant to those who had fired and fueled 
his intellect, in this case the Sinhāla commentators whose lost works he claims 
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to summarize. One might fairly say that his writings are the distillation of a 
thousand years of observation and reflection in the context of a research program 
initiated by Śākyamuni the Buddha himself. They are more than that, though: 
they are also testimony to a true innovator, a pioneer, and a creative thinker. 
Having reviewed rival hypotheses of three of his predecessors, he wonders who 
is right and he answers, pointedly, ‘Nobody: we should accept what is right in 
the claims of each’ (Fount 287). He was an innovator, and self-consciously so, 
sometimes openly declaring that he was going beyond anything that can be 
found in the older commentaries, even acknowledging that his new thoughts 
had not yet gone far enough. Excellent studies of Buddhaghosa’s life, affiliations, 
role as author and commentator, and general intellectual project have been made 
(Endo 2008; Collins 2009; Gethin 2012; Heim 2014, forthcoming), and here I 
will focus exclusively on his philosophy. Many of his original ideas are in com-
mentaries on the canonical Abhidhamma-piṭaka, especially his Fount of Meaning 
(Atthasālinī, his commentary on the Dhammasan˙gani) and Dispeller of Delusion 
(Samoha-vinodanī, his commentary on the Vibhan˙ga)—and perhaps he permitted 
himself a little greater philosophical license there than in his manual, the Path 
of Purification (Visuddha-magga), a synthetic and comprehensive description of the 
Buddhist path, or in ‘his’ synoptic commentaries on the Sutta-piṭaka (the Majj-
hima-, Saṃyutta-, Aṅguttara-, and Dīgha-Nikāya aṭṭhakathās).
To Buddhaghosa, it was evident that the study of the human mind is a com-
mon human affair. Acknowledging that open questions remain, he called on 
others to do the same, saying of one such extension,
This is just a sketch. An in-depth understanding of this question of the 
[function of consciousness] is only to be gained on the strength of one’s 
selection after considering views, one’s estimation of reasons, one’s prefer-
ences and credences, learning and testimonial reports.
(Fount 74)
Some writers on Buddhaghosa have felt it necessary to try to demonstrate that 
all of his ideas are already in earlier works, not merely in the early Sinhāla com-
mentators, but in the canonical Abhidhamma itself—a project somewhat akin 
to arguing that all of Plotinus is already in Plato. Another trend, in tension with 
the first, has been to assume that every conceptual development is an instance 
of philosophical progress, historians and historiographers claiming that the ideas 
of the Buddhist philosophers who came after Buddhaghosa—the ‘Buddhist 
epistemologists’ like Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, for example, or the Madhyamaka 
philosophy of Candrakīrti—render obsolete Buddhaghosa’s own theories (I will 
say more about Dignāga later). Neither trend does justice to his greatness. It is, 
for example, only because of Buddhaghosa’s spirit of open inquiry that the 
question recently posed by Theravāda Buddhist modernizers like the Burmese 
activist and Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, the question whether Buddhism 
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has the resources to articulate distinctive conceptions of human rights grounded 
in non-Kantian understandings of dignity, can hope for an answer.
In the works of Buddhaghosa, we find a philosophy of mind completely free 
from the grip of the picture that has captivated—and enslaved—speculation 
about the mind in the west: the picture of the mind as ‘mediational’, the picture 
that Charles Taylor describes—using the first person plural to aggregate deep 
trends of thought in the Western world—as ‘a big mistake operating in our 
culture, a kind of operative (mis)understanding of what it is to know, which has 
had dire effects on both theory and practice in a host of domains’ (2013: 61). 
What is clear is how thoroughly Buddhaghosa is distanced from a ‘mediational’ 
picture of the relationship between mind and world, which has it that reality is 
taken up by way of an inner self performing mental operations on internal 
representations. In what follows, I will give three examples of Buddhaghosan 
greatness. I will claim that we can legitimately speak of him as the founder of 
a distinct stance in philosophy, as Analytical Philosophy and Phenomenology are 
stances. I will show how he transforms an ancient metaphor in order to provide 
a new understanding of human agency. And I will demonstrate that he has a 
sophisticated analysis of human beings in relation to one another, a theory of 
our engagement with each other in the social world.
3. Buddhaghosa’s Attentionalism
Attentionalism, as I will call the stance that lends attention centrality in explana-
tory projects in philosophy, encourages us to rethink many central concepts in 
the philosophy of mind from an attention-theoretic perspective. It is a policy, 
not a proposition; a body of guidelines as to how to think about the mind. Van 
Fraassen says that ‘a philosophical position can consist in a stance (attitude, com-
mitment, approach, a cluster of such)’ (2002: 48), and the idea is helpfully elabo-
rated by Anjan Chakravartty (2004: 175), who comments that
a stance is a strategy, or a combination of strategies, for generating factual 
beliefs. A stance makes no claim about reality, at least directly, It is rather 
a sort of epistemic ‘policy’ concerning which methodologies should be 
adopted in the generation of factual beliefs . . . Stances are not themselves 
propositional; they are guidelines for ways of acting. One does not believe 
a stance in the way one believes a fact. Rather one commits to a stance, 
or adopts it.
Buddhaghosa’s Attentionalism is strikingly on display in the organizational struc-
ture of his most famous work, The Path to Purification. The whole book takes 
the overt form of a sustained reflection on the meaning of a single quotation 
from the Canon: ‘Cultivate attention, bhikkhus; a bhikkhu who attends knows 
things as they are’ (samādhiṃ, bhikkhave, bhāvetha; samāhito, bhikkhave, bhikkhu 
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yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti, S iii.13). The book begins and ends with this quotation, 
and its contents are substantially devoted to exploring the meaning of this one 
statement. What is put forward here is an application of a general epistemic 
principle: that attention is, in normal circumstances, sufficient for knowledge. 
The application in question speaks of a particular sort of attention, expert absorbed 
attention (samādhi), and a particular sort of knowledge, insight (paññā) into fun-
damental moral truths. Much is to be said about the varieties of attention, about 
what expertise consists in and how it is cultivated, about the relationship between 
attention, perceptual experience, consciousness, knowledge, and truth. Buddhag-
hosa’s discussion of the nature of consciousness and attention is indeed of 
unparalleled brilliance. Conscious perceptual experience is a form of active 
involvement with the world, while cognitive processes transform the mind’s first 
acknowledgments into fully intentional thought. There is no self as controlling 
agent of thinking, believing, and feeling. Attention instead is what explains the 
activity of thought and mind.
Yet it is striking that there is no single word in Pāli or Sanskrit for English 
‘attention’, and from Buddhaghosa’s perspective the search for something that 
can be called the essence of attention is a mistake. Buddhaghosa’s view is rather, 
as we might put it, that there are many kinds of attention. These kinds of 
attention are put to work to explain perception, memory, testimony, self-
awareness, empathy, and end-of-life experience, and they are all, Buddhaghosa 
further claims, fundamentally grounded in the embodied sense modalities. He 
is against representations and so against Representationalism, and he dispenses 
with an earlier perceptual model of introspection, but he is in favor of the 
inseparability of intentional content and phenomenal character. In his treatment 
of the cognitive processes of attentional capture, he anticipates the concept of 
working memory, the idea of mind as a global workplace, subliminal orienting, 
and the thesis that visual processing occurs at three levels. He is unlike nearly 
every other Buddhist philosopher in that he discusses episodic memory and 
knows it as a reliving of experience from one’s personal past; but he blocks any 
reduction of the phenomenology of temporal experience to the representation 
of oneself as in the past. The alternative claim that episodic memory is a phe-
nomenon of attention is one that he develops with greater sophistication than 
has been done elsewhere. He attentional analysis of empathy, our ability to 
know the minds of others, is similarly innovative. He agrees with the ancients, 
and with thinkers like Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch who have drawn inspira-
tion from them, in claiming that moral attention—the settling on what is good 
(i.e., wholesome, kusala) and the shunning of what is bad (akusala)—is a distinct 
ethical virtue. At the end of life, he says, one attends to that which has given 
one’s life its significance.
Buddhaghosa’s Attentionalism is a stance distinct from the stances of Phe-
nomenology and Analytical Philosophy, and should not be conflated with 
either. His attention-theoretic approach brings important new options to the 
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table in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science, providing 
new directions to recent work on the pervasiveness of the mental, embodied 
cognition, cognitive phenomenology, intersubjectivity, and the experience of 
time. Two large bodies of data about attention are available to an aspiring 
Attentionalist today: first, the rich experimental studies of contemporary cogni-
tive psychology— and it has been argued that attention is, of all cognitive 
functions, the most thoroughly studied—and second, Buddhaghosa’s treatment 
the information that emerged as a result of meticulous Buddhist observation 
of the human mind’s structure and functioning in the first 1,000 years after 
the Buddha lived.
4. Human Agency
That the Buddhist denial of ‘self ’ (atta) is a denial of the specific notion of self 
as origin of willed directives is hinted at by canonical passages such as this:
People are intent on the idea of ‘I-making’ and attached to the idea of 
‘other-making’. Some don’t realise this, nor do they see it as an arrow. 
But to one who, having extracted this arrow, sees, [the thought] ‘I am 
doing,’ doesn’t occur, [the thought] ‘Another is doing’ doesn’t occur.
(Udāna 6.6)
An identification of self with control, and the rejection of it, is more exactly 
formulated in another key canonical text, the Sutta on the Definition of No-Self, 
which has the Buddha declaring of intending, and indeed of any constituent of 
a mental life, that
intending is nonself. For if, bhikkus, intending were self . . . it would be 
possible to have it of intending, ‘Let my intending be thus; let my intend-
ing not be thus’. . . But because intending is nonself . . . it is not possible 
to have it of intending, ‘Let my intending be thus; let my intending not 
be thus’.
(S.iii.66–7; M.i.230–3)
Here, an equivalence is affirmed between the denial of self and the denial 
of voluntariness or volition in intention. The Buddha’s leading argument 
against a conception of self as the agent of mental (and physical) acts is that 
every constituent of a mental life is subject to change, and ‘Is what is imper-
manent, suffering, and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: “This is 
mine, this I am, this is my self?” ’ (S.iii.67). It may help to imagine, as fictional 
genealogy, the conception having arisen by taking as primary an account of 
distanced control and transferring it to the case of self-control. For indeed, 
in such texts as the Bhagavad-gītā, human beings are portrayed as remotely 
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governed, a divine agent responsible for all of their apparently autonomous 
acts: ‘O Arjuna, the Lord resides in the heart-area of all beings, making all 
beings revolve through his magical power [as if they were] mounted on a 
machine’ (Bh.Gī. 18.61). Madhūsudana explains the phrase ‘mounted on a 
machine’ (yantrārūḍhāni) as meaning ‘just like a magician who causes the 
completely non-independent wooden human forms, etc., to revolve, seated 
on a machine, etc., moved by a rope’. The idea of an inner agent whose 
intentions causes actions comes into being when the magician or puppeteer 
in this depiction of distal control is simply internalized: the self is now an 
inner magician pulling the strings that cause the human body to move. 
Śaṃkara’s comments on Bh.Gī. 4.13 can be read as straightforwardly reject-
ing the causal theory of action while allowing room for some conception 
of self other than an agentive one. In fact it is harmless enough to refer to 
overt actions as having an agent because there is the physical human being 
to stand in that role, but at the moment when we offer the same description 
of mental actions, the rejected ‘Authorship View’ of self materializes as if 
from nowhere (Peacocke 2007, 2014).
A debunking genealogy of the origins of this theory of human agency 
helps to loosen its grip. A human being is not like a drone, with a detached 
if now internalized control center, but is instead more like a self-driving 
vehicle whose various complex perceptual, motor, and planning systems enable 
it to navigate its environment. There is no driver, no charioteer, no inner 
magician; rather, there is a complex of mutually interacting components. It 
is in order to articulate this alternative model that Buddhaghosa appropriates 
but transforms the metaphor of the machine. He expresses the idea that human 
beings are without inner originators of mental action, by likening them to 
mechanical dolls or marionettes, which seem, but only seem, as if they are 
animated from within:
Just as a mechanical doll (dāru-yanta) is empty (suñña), soulless (nijjiva), and 
undirected (nirīhaka), and while it walks and stands merely through the 
combination of strings and wood, yet it seems as if it had direction and 
occupation (savyāpāra); so too, this minded body (nāma-rūpa) is empty, 
soulless and undirected, and while it walks and stands merely through the 
combination of the two together, yet it seems as if it had direction and 
occupation.
(Path 594 [xviii.31])
The point of the analogy is not, of course, to deny that human beings have 
intentions in and for action (cetanā); and, when it is said that intentional 
action is like the movement of a mechanical doll, the point is not that our 
actions are entirely mechanical and automatic, but is instead that, just as the 
marionette’s movements seem—but only seem—as if produced by an inner 
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directing self within, so likewise do ours. In fact, they are not: they are simply 
the bodily aspect of an intention in action, the intention itself embodied. 
The metaphor of the marionette is introduced only to resist that of the 
charioteer:
There isn’t some sort of self inside that does the bending and stretching 
[when one sits up] . . . there is no self of any kind inside which puts on 
the robe [when one puts on a robe] . . . there is no self of any kind inside 
which does the eating [when one eats].
(Dispeller 258–62)
Agent causalism and the Authorship View are clearly identified as the target: 
‘There is no agent (kattā) or author (kāretā) who says, “Let you be the untasked 
state, you be sense-door instruction, you be seeing, you be receiving, you be 
examining, you be determining, you be running” ’ (Fount 271–2).
There is an alternative both to imagining that all human action must have 
its origin in a detached agent and its intentions and depicting human beings as 
entirely passive, deterministically propelled by efficient causation, and that is to 
understand that mindedness, notably attention, is already an activity. ‘Is there 
such a thing as action? Yes. Is there such a thing as the author of action (karma-
kārako)? No, that cannot be truly said,’ the Kathāvatthu succinctly puts it, con-
tinuing, ‘Is action one thing, the author of it something else? No, that cannot 
be truly said’ (Kathāvatthu 53). One need not deny that it is possible, as a matter 
of grammatical convention, to speak of an ‘author’ of experiencing whenever 
there is an experience, or an ‘author’ of acting whenever there is an action. In 
Indo-European languages, at least, one can always reformulate the description of 
an activity (‘the flowing of water’) in a subject-predicate grammatical form (‘the 
water flows’). Yet the move from the grammatical truism that, for every activity 
there is something we can designate as its ‘agent’, to the claim that there is a 
single agent of every action is clearly fallacious (technically, it is known as a 
quantifier-shift fallacy). Buddhists make the point by saying that the agentive 
construction is simply an idiomatic way of speaking, an ‘accessory locution’ 
(sasambhāra-kathā), like ‘His bow shot him’ meaning ‘An arrow from his bow shot 
him,’ or as the phrase ‘on seeing a visible object with the eye’ is idiomatic for 
‘on seeing a visible object with a moment of visual awareness’ (Path 20; cf. 
Karunadasa 2010: 147). Similarly, commonplace attributions of agency to physical 
objects (‘the knife cuts well’; ‘the washing machine has nearly finished its cycle’) 
are neither problematic nor exciting.
It would evidently be quite wrong to conclude from his appeal to the mari-
onette simile that Buddhaghosa’s view is that a mental life is entirely passive. 
Rather, a quite different account of the distinction between activity and passivity 
is put forward. Mental activity is described first as a conscious ‘bending’ (namana) 
of mind onto world, which ‘bending’ consists in being in conscious 
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concomitance (cetasika) with the intentionality of the mental (citta) (Path 527 
[xvii.48], 588 [xviii.4]; Dispeller 136). Active mindedness (nāma) includes atten-
tional selecting (overt or covert focusing on one from among a group of leaves 
in the field of awareness), attentional placing (centering one leaf by excluding 
others), attentional rehearsing (repeating a number one has been given while 
looking for a piece of paper, or an image of a leaf that has gone out of view 
so as to identify it when it reappears), and attentional effort (a ‘straining’ that 
substitutes for will). Other ways by which mind ‘bends’ onto world include felt 
evaluating (for a pain is not a brute happening but is instead an evaluation of 
something as harmful and a corresponding shrinking away), cognitively assigning 
mental labels to enable identification or recognition (seeing Ānanda as ‘Ānanda’), 
and preserving the boundaries of an experience in relation to others. Accom-
panying, and in some sense prior to, all of these activities is the activity of 
becoming ‘in touch’ with the world, a minimally active operational intentionality, 
a perceptual presence to the world that hovers in a grey area between active 
intentionality and embodied passivity (rūpa), where passivity has to be understood 
in terms of the notion of being ‘molested’ (rūpana) by the world’s causal influ-
ence. These are the activities that go on inside intentional consciousness, but 
none is rightly thought of as the voluntary performance of an agent. If ‘bending’ 
onto the world is a modulation of conscious intentionality, another notion of 
mental activity is also available, one that consists in ‘tasking’ the mind through 
the activation of a variety of cognitive psychological modules (mano-dhātu). 
Such activities include subliminal orienting, constructing a sensory field, per-
ceptually processing a stimulus to identify spatial boundaries and object category, 
late attentional gate-keeping, and the ‘running’ (javana) of working memory. 
This is a psychological or cognitive scientific notion of mental activity at a level 
underneath that of conscious thought. The most minimal such activity is the 
sending of an instruction (āvajjana; ‘turning toward’) to a sensory system to turn 
on or open up, a subliminal orienting toward a stimulus. Untasked thought 
(bhavaṅga, the rest or default state) is now what is to be described as ‘passive’; 
the content of the default state consists in a residue of ‘innate’ autobiographical 
semantic information.
In order to appreciate the greatness of Buddhaghosa’s approach to human 
agency, it may be helpful to compare it with a contrasting appeal to the mari-
onette metaphor in a recent book by Peter Carruthers. He puts the idea as 
follows (2015b, summarizing his 2015a):
In this manner our conscious minds are continually under the control of 
our unconscious thoughts. We [unconsciously] decide what to pay atten-
tion to, what to remember, what to think of, what to imagine, and what 
sentences to rehearse in inner speech. There is control, of course, and it 
is a form of self-control. But it is not control by a conscious self. Rather 
what we take to be the conscious self is a puppet manipulated by our 
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unconscious goals, beliefs, and decisions. Who’s in charge? Well, we are. 
But the ‘we’ who are in charge are not the conscious selves we take our-
selves to be, but rather a set of unconsciously operating mental states. 
Consciousness does make a difference. Indeed, it is vital to the overall 
functioning of the human mind. But a controlling conscious self is an 
illusion.
Carruthers’s ‘conscious self ’ is what we are calling the Authorship View of Self 
or the ‘mythological monad of practical reason’, and he agrees that it is an 
illusion. Yet Carruthers’s position is instructively distinct from the one to be 
defended by Buddhaghosa. He argues that control mechanisms are only uncon-
scious, and that they consist in the operations of working memory. This, though, 
has the counter-intuitive effect of rendering intentional action unconscious: 
‘beliefs, goals, and decisions are never conscious. Rather, these states pull the 
strings in the background, selecting and manipulating the sensory-based contents 
that do figure in consciousness . . . we are under the illusion that the decision 
is a conscious one’ (ibid.); ‘all decisions are unconscious, resulting from competi-
tive interactions among goals, desires, information, and/or action plans’ (2015a: 
237). So, when Carrutthers describes the conscious mind as a marionette, what 
he means is that its strings are pulled by subpersonal-level operations. Paraphrased 
in Buddhist terminology, Carruthers’s picture has it that the only way for 
mindedness to be active is in the activation of cognitive modules, and that this 
activity is causally determinative of apparent conscious activity. What this shows 
is that Carruthers is committed to the Authorship View, with its claim that 
the only way for conscious thought to be autonomous is for it to be authored. 
Buddhaghosa avoids this commitment by drawing a careful distinction between 
the two notions of minded activity mentioned earlier. In terms of the marionette 
metaphor, the whole point is that one must not make the mistake of thinking 
that the control mechanisms pulling the strings have to be subpersonal causal 
determinants: there are other sorts of determinative interdependencies between 
the conscious concomitants that modulate intentional awareness, the various 
‘consciousness-level’ factors that actively contribute to being in a conscious 
intentional state, and that jointly operate together as a single system. Our con-
scious mental lives are controlled neither from outside nor from below: their 
autonomy is sui generis.
5. Empathy: Awareness of Others
Empathy relates to a person’s ability to comprehend the intentions, emotions, 
and other states of mind of another, to assume what can be called a ‘second-
personal’ view in which others appear not merely as bodies but as embodied 
‘you’s. The term ‘empathy’ is used here as a translation of the German Einfühlung 
(Zahavi 2010: 289), meaning the idea of an ability to acknowledge others as 
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others, and in that sense to understand others, rather than the idea of concern 
for or care for others: ‘Whereas empathy has to do with a basic understanding 
of expressive others, sympathy adds care or concern for the other’ (Zahavi 2008: 
516). Empathy, in this sense, is an awareness of the mental state of another while 
sympathy is a concern for their mental state. Such an ability has standardly been 
interpreted as consisting either in the individual’s possession of a theory of mind 
that enables them to attribute states of mind in virtue of the other’s behavior 
(so-called theory-theory), or else as involving a simulation of the other’s states 
of mind by mirroring or imagining them as one’s own. Much of the contem-
porary discussion in social cognition concerns the respective merits of theory-
theory and simulation. Recently, an interesting third proposal has been put 
forward, that empathy has to do rather with the direct acquaintance of another’s 
attitudes in and through their bodily expression (Gallagher 2005; Zahavi 2007, 
2008, 2010; Gangopadhyay 2014). Zahavi finds the view anticipated in Max 
Scheler’s (1954: 260) remark that
we certainly believe ourselves to be directly acquainted with another per-
son’s joy in his laughter, with his sorrow and pain in his tears, with his 
shame in his blushing, with his entreaty in his outstretched hands . . . If 
anyone tells me that this is not ‘perception’ . . . I would beg him to . . . 
address the phenomenological facts.
According to this analysis, empathy consists in a type of perception of others’ 
mental lives. Empathy is ‘our ability to access the mind of others in their bodily 
and behavioural expressions’ (Zahavi 2008: 522). Note that Zahavi prefers to 
speak of ‘experiential access’ rather than ‘perception’, perhaps reflecting discomfort 
with Scheler’s idea that empathy is literally a perceptual skill.
Buddhaghosa’s analysis is radically different: what he says is that social cogni-
tion is a proprietary kind of attention. Prior to theoretical understanding of 
others as minded beings there is a form of embodied intersubjective engagement 
in which the other’s embodied actions serve to enable direct attention to them 
as intentional others. In Buddhaghosa’s embodied approach to social cognition, 
perception of the other’s bodily deportment does not constitute experiential 
access to their state of mind but rather enables a proprietary sort of attention 
to it. The idea is that there is a way in which a conscious being disposes itself, 
which serves to ‘intimate’ the mental state within. It is not the consciousness-
endowed body as such, but a very particular change of mode, which endowment 
with consciousness enables, by which the body is kept firm, held up, and moved. 
Buddhaghosa states that the distinctive movement of the eyes is an intimation of 
a person’s intention to look (Dispeller 356). The intimation can be called an 
instrumental bodily act (kāyika-karaṇa). One does not just see the intimation in 
another’s posture and movement; one notices the other’s intentions through the 
embodied intimation:
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What does it intimate? One [kind of] bodily instrumentality; for someone 
standing in the eye’s focus lifts up a head or a foot or shifts the head or 
an eyebrow. Now this mode of [comportment of] the hand, etc., is cog-
nizable by the eye; but the intimation is not cognizable by the eye, it is 
cognizable only by the mind. For by means of the eye one only sees 
colours excited by the alteration in the hand, etc., but one knows the 
intimation by means of late attentional gate-keeping [lit. mind-door cog-
nizance] cognizing that ‘He seems to be doing such and such’.
(Fount 83)
A certain bodily comportment, a ‘stiffening, alteration, and movement of the 
body’, when attended to in a certain way, falls under the description ‘He seems 
to be beckoning me.’ A possible reading of these comments is that they simply 
formulate the standard argument that the mental states of others can be inferred 
from their observable physical behavior. Some support for that reading indeed 
comes from the examples that Buddhaghosa employs: the door of a wine shop 
bears a flag, and people know ‘There is wine here’; the tree moves about, and 
people know ‘There is wind’; the fish let out bubbles, and people know ‘There 
are fish in the water’; and, from the tangle of leaves, grass, and rubbish, people 
know ‘There was a flood’ (Fount 83). One can easily read these comments as 
pointing to acts of inference, from an observed sign to something else that is 
mentally deduced (mano-viññeya). Yet that reading is a mistake. For Buddhaghosa 
has been very careful and circumspect in his formulation of the claim. He has 
said that one sees a displacement in the body, and one then ascribes to another 
an intention, with a thought process not itself caused by perceptual processing. 
Here the attribution of an intention has exactly the same cognitive profile as 
the cases we reviewed before, such as thinking of a past event because of having 
seen it before, with one’s thought process triggered by some current cue. Likewise, 
here one attributes an intention because of having seen the bodily comportment. 
So, we should describe the claim as being that social cognition is attention to 
others’ states of mind, with one’s perception of their behavior serving not as a 
reason but as a cause. You raise your aim and, through that, my attention is 
drawn to your intention to beckon me.
If this is right, then Buddhaghosa’s account of our ability to be aware of the 
mental states of others is that their bodily demeanor enables us to attend to their 
intentions, wishes, preferences, and so on. Posture and movement are attention-
enabling, rather than inference-enabling, conditions in our consciousness of 
others’ minds. Moreover, given that we are not thinking of such states as ‘inner 
entities’, and given that Buddhaghosa always ties the contents of consciousness 
to the sense modalities, what we should say is that our thought about another’s 
intention or desire consists in a peculiar manner in which we attend due to 
their bodily posture and demeanor. That way of attending just is what it is to 
entertain the thought, ‘He wants me to do this.’
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6. Buddhaghosa’s Legacy
A way to gain an appreciation of a philosopher’s greatness is to compare them 
with great successors. Dignāga (480–540 CE) is a Buddhist philosopher who 
spent his working life in the Buddhist university of Nālandā, one of the most 
impressive institutions of higher education in South Asia—indeed, in its time, 
in the world. Dignāga owed much to internal dialogue with a contemporary of 
his, the grammarian-cum-philosopher Bhartṛhari. His disciple Dharmakīrti would 
go on to reinvent Dignāga’s innovation and adapt it to the needs of new Bud-
dhist communities in ways of which Dignāga himself may not have imagined, 
most notably by giving it an idealist inflection. Dignāga’s break-through work 
was decisive in shaping the next period of Indian philosophy, a cosmopolitan 
Age of Dialogue in Sanskrit that runs at least until the transitioning of Buddhists 
like Kamalaśīla to Tibet. An emerging scholarly consensus agrees in identifying 
Dignāga as marking the beginning of a new era in Indian philosophical thought, 
some scholars emphasizing his theoretical innovations and others his transforma-
tion of discursive practice (Lusthaus 2002: 363; McCrea 2013: 129–30). Dignāga’s 
new citational and critical practices were swiftly adopted by his opponents. As 
important as these shifts in doctrinal formulation and discursive practice was the 
transformation that Dignāga achieved in ways of reasoning, with a movement 
away from an epistemic localism to a rule-based universalism. Now, too, the 
precise formulation of definitions of key philosophical concepts takes center-stage 
as constitutive of philosophical practice, rival definitions of what purports to be 
a single concept locking horns in contexts of philosophical debate. Rapidly, this 
became the hallmark of philosophical activity in a broad Sanskrit cosmopolis 
that was to endure for centuries and whose geographical borders spread well 
beyond the subcontinent.
From a point of view centered on Buddhaghosa, however, Dignāga is to be 
held to account for introducing into the history of Buddhist philosophy of 
mind not only the Myth of Mediation but also the Myth of the Given, ‘the 
fatal dichotomy between a supposedly brutely given, nonconceptual sensory 
content and free, rationally articulated belief ’ (Carman 2013: 167), by reducing 
the role of concepts to that of pawns in the game of inference, with his cel-
ebrated redefinition of perceptual experience as that which is free from con-
ceptual construction. One could say, in very general terms, that Sanskritic 
discourse about mind began with Dignāga to become sharply polarized between 
advocates of an experiential and phenomenological approach and proponents 
of a conceptualist and normative approach. The greatness of Buddhaghosa, we 
can now appreciate, is that it talks about the mind without this polarization, 
and it searches for a theory in which the claims of the experiential and the 
normative are respected in equal measure. If the ambition of a theory of mind 
is to account for the unity that exists between the demands of experience and 
of reason, then this is the literature in which an answer is most likely to found. 
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Perhaps, indeed, this is another mark of greatness—that the work of a great 
philosopher can withstand the vicissitudes of philosophical fashion, and always 
threatens a return.
Buddhaghosa’s influence on the development of Buddhist philosophy in Sri 
Lanka, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand has been and continues 
to be immense. Important innovations do certainly occur in these countries after 
him, in the work of Ānanda, Dhammapāla1, Dhammapāla2, and Anuruddha, as 
well as in nineteenth-century Burmese reinventions that are also in part responses 
to British colonial occupation. In fact, from the fifth to the eighth century a 
vast Hindu and Theravāda intellectual civilization spread throughout Southeast 
Asia, the full story of which has yet be chronicled (a beginning is made in Guy 
2014), but one in which Buddhaghosa was surely a defining intellectual presence. 
I began by suggesting that, to count as a great, a philosopher must draw on a 
past intellectual history, rethink it, and adapt it in such a way that the landscape 
is irrevocably altered—indeed, in such a way that any later thinker cannot help 
but look back on the past as it was before that thinker as, if not antiquated, then 
at least as meaningful only in terms of the rearticulation that has now been 
provided. Buddhaghosa drew on an already very rich philosophical landscape, 
based on a thousand years of analysis and reflection on the thought of the Bud-
dha, which he transformed into a new theory of the human subject, of persons 
as living entities with a characteristic capacity for attention. I think that’s pretty 
great.
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